Ralph Dumain: "The Autodidact Project": Review: "The Routledge Handbook of the History of Philosophy of Science After Kant" (I-III)

The Routledge Handbook of the
History of Philosophy of Science After Kant:

Running commentary by Ralph Dumain

The Routledge Handbook of the History of Philosophy of Science After Kant, edited by Flavia Padovani and Adam Tamas Tuboly. Abingdon, Oxon, UK; New York: Routledge, 2026. (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy) xxii, 571 pp.

Table of contents (on this site).

I

Anglo-American philosophical literature tends to be incestuous, and I think that applies to philosophy of science as well, but this volume is not so limited. Noteworthy for me are chapters on Gaston Bachelard and related thinkers, and the American New Realists featuring my favorite classical American philosopher Roy Wood Sellars (critical realism). I am disappointed that a couple of my favorite contemporary philosophers/historians of science―Harold I. Brown and Mario Bunge―are not to be found in this volume.

Reading the book’s introduction―HOPOS Unfolded: Roadmap to the discipline―I see I may have missed something important:

[....] The history of philosophy of science, taken literally, could be understood as a historical field, whose subject is philosophy of science. In this sense, strictly speaking, HOPOS may not appear to be a philosophical field, but rather one concerned with the historical development of a philosophical field. Unlike some of its close allies, such as History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) and Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (&HPS), which primarily center on science itself, the main focus of HOPOS, at face value, is philosophy of science rather than science per se.

These distinctions may account for what I judge to be missing, but I do not understand them.

Here is something interesting:

For the past 20 years, the image of the institutionalization of philosophy of science has been frequently associated with the very peculiar political conditions in the Cold War era (Reisch 2005). However, thanks to the painstaking empirical research of HOPOS scholars, we are now starting to revise this account and incorporate more essential details and other relevant factors that were not featured in the “icy slopes” tales. Histories of departments (Verhaegh 2025a, 2025b), developments of journals (Katzav and Vaesen 2017; Katzav 2018), changes in the funding systems (Vaesen and Katzav 2019; Reisch and Tuboly ms.), and discipline‑building norms (Dewulf 2021, 2025) have now been extensively and substantially studied, allowing us to gain a more layered, nuanced, and richer grasp of new historical materials and actors as well.

In other words, the triumph of logical positivism in the USA is not simply an effect of McCarthyism and the Cold War.

And this:

[….] Very often, when philosophy of science is introduced to students and/or to a wider audience, it is classically illustrated through major movements (with their corresponding central figures) and topics, generally associated with analytic and logical machineries. Verification, falsification, laws of nature, confirmation, realism, scientific explanation, probability, and induction, to just name a few, are recursively mentioned as part of philosophy of science’s core curriculum. Those who pursue studies in these areas are inclined to adopt the view that sees science as a more theoretical, conceptual, and abstract edifice along the lines of many 20th‑century philosophers.

However, an alternative, more “humanistic” approach can also be identified in the history of philosophy of science and it is basically parallel to its more institutionalized and specialized form. This approach was fittingly epitomized in the writings of influential figures such as Ernst Cassirer, John Dewey, F.S.C. Northrop, and James Conant.5 Scholars who have adopted this perspective have maintained that philosophy is inherently a cultural and humanistic enterprise, in which its own history plays a pivotal role. They have argued that philosophy should rather keep its direct, meaningful, and practical connection to human life and values, and that by doing so, it should address the urgent (often ethical and political) challenges of the time.

The humanist approach dominated in the first half of the 20^th century, the technical approach dominated the second half. Shifts in various reference and textbooks are noted. My favorite positivist Phillip Frank (1957) is mentioned.

The editors announce that the emphasis of the book is to be on the 20^th century and the 19^th century will not be thoroughly covered.

II

Most surprising of all in this volume is the chapter on “Marxist philosophy and history of science” by Christopher Coenen, Aleksandra Kazakova, Natalia Nikiforova, Alfred Nordmann and Oliver Schlaudt (pp. 262-272).

The authors begin by claiming that Marxists came out on both sides of the recent ‘Science Wars’. Beginning with Marx and Engels, science on the one hand is viewed positively (and taken up philosophically especially by Engels), and Marxism itself is intended as a science, and on the other science itself is subjected to a Marxist perspective, from the perspective of historical materialism as first formulated in The German Ideology. So we are looking at science’s role in capitalist production as well as the role of capitalism in the formation of the sciences. The focus of this chapter will be the historical materialist approach to Science Studies.

There are both virtues and limitations to this chapter, and while the conclusion is largely favorable to Marxism, the literature and range of ideas consulted are limited as well a perspective that has the flavor of over-reliance on Helena Sheehan.

“[....] What we want to show is that today’s science studies carry with it a significant but largely unconscious Marxist legacy, a legacy that could only be taken on board by depoliticizing it, thereby making it invisible, but above all by passing up the chance of a truly interdisciplinary, global and political version of science studies. The result is today’s hegemonic “philosophy of science” as a self‑isolating, depoliticized and Eurocentric project. An important step in this process of making it invisible was the reduction of Marxism to a form of externalism. The inappropriateness of this reductive view will be highlighted throughout the chapter.

According to the twofold position of science in Marxism […] two traditions of Marxist philosophy of science can be provisionally distinguished: one refers positively to scientific knowledge, that seeks to integrate it and process it in a philosophical way, and sees in scientific progress an important factor for social and emancipatory progress. The other tradition understands science as a component of capitalist modernity, raising the question of the extent to which science has to be understood as an indigenous phenomenon specific to bourgeois‑capitalist societies. The systematic distinction corresponds to different political constellations. The first tradition underwrites the launching of proletarian science in the socialist East which is a very different project from applying the second tradition to the critique of bourgeois science in the capitalist West. We will use this provisional division as a basis for this chapter, in which we will now outline the different positions in order to arrive at a more nuanced survey.

This looks promising. Now, the history ....

Engels’ overarching view of Dialectics of Nature is discussed, which was not only official in the Soviet bloc but plays a developing contemporary role in China. Lenin’s epistemology in Materialism and Empiriocriticism is asserted to be consonant with Popper’s fallibilism, a juxtaposition surprising to me.

Marxist science of science transcends the externalism‑internalism dichotomy, the bare statement with which I agree. The authors present three historical cases in which these two approaches are not cleanly distinguishable: Hessen, Bernal, and Needham. There are some interesting tidbits here, but more detail and analysis would help. There is a whole section on the Austro-Marxist philosopher Edgar Zilsel, a figure new to me. He was a positivist influenced by Neo-Kantianism, which would put him logically in the Vienna Circle’s left wing. According to the ‘Zilsel thesis’, the development of the natural sciences was only made possible by early capitalism, in which the barrier between scholars and artisans broke down. Rather than the usual historical focus on celestial mechanics. Zilsel’s sociology highlights “the art of weighing, fortress architecture, ballistics, etc.”

The next section is on ‘historical epistemology’. One tradition in this category is Marxist, and it developed at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science out of a generation that recovered “the forgotten literature of the 1930s and 1940s, in particular the writings of Hessen, Henryk Grossmann, and Zilsel.” Of special interest to me is Peter Damerow’s theory of the historical development of cognitive structures, especially arithmetic. Hans‑Jörg Rheinberger developed the thesis that the ‘experimental system’ morphs into ‘epistemic things’.

The subsequent section is titled ‘Symmetry thesis: The Strong Programme’, which is odd considering who is discussed. There was an internalist rebellion to the above, but not detailed, and against this two approaches arose: (1) the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK); (2) the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School attacked technocracy but omitted key ingredients of the modern world. Adorno and Marcuse debated Popper.

The SSK “Edinburgh School” put forth the ‘strong programme’, which in my view does not belong to Marxism at all though it is externalist. The authors concede this.

Next come Bourdieu, and Latour (Actor Network Theory =ANT). Bourdieu at least nods to Marxism with his concept of a field as ‘a space of power’. The question of scientific truth remains unresolved. Latour has succeeded in the depoliticization of science studies, but while he is part of the narrative flow of this chapter, this charlatan has no place in a chapter devoted to Marxism.

The question of re-politicization of science studies arises in the wake of the New Left. Marxism apparently fades while feminist and postcolonial epistemologies proliferate. They nonetheless touch on “George Lukács’s “standpoint epistemology”.” I strongly object to associating Lukács or any Marxist with standpoint epistemology.

The authors conclude by regretting the occlusion of Marxism―named somewhat more specifically as Historical Materialism―which is nonetheless foundational for science studies. They close with a quote from Helena Sheehan (2002): “There is not much in the way of thinking that is simultaneously empirically grounded, philosophically integrated, and sociohistorically contextualized. This is what Marxism could bring to bear.” I’m not seeing much in the way of philosophical integration here but rather a narrowing which is an artifact of the authors’ narrative. Next I shall clarify what is missing in this chapter.

The argument of the chapter is how Marxist historical materialism has been progressively (or regressively) occluded, but in the process the authors occlude too much of Marxist philosophy applicable to the sciences, where they could have dispensed with the ‘strong programme’, feminist epistemology, and Bruno Latour.

Outline of what is to come:

1. Marx: omission of his philosophy of science: Capital.

2. Engels: dialectics of nature: nonreductive materialism /emergentism /integrative levels (Needham) are mentioned, but not the problem of dialectics and the question of contradiction in Engels’ overall epistemology.

2b: These lapses resemble Sheehan, who doesn’t understand dialectics either.

3. Frankfurt School: mischaracterization — Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer.

4. Significant omissions, e.g. Poznan School, Della Volpe, Soviet philosophy: Ilyenkov; Soviet bloc works & critiques of positivism & irrationalism.

III

The very point of departure of this chapter foreshadows its limitations: “The fate of Marxist science studies,” a worthy topic but one which cuts off half of Marxist philosophy of science. Marx himself is completely missing from this picture. While Marx himself did not have much to say directly about the natural sciences, Marx himself had a philosophy of science, a conception of abstraction and idealization, a critique of positivism, in his own work on Capital. How could this be left out of a treatment of the history of the philosophy of science?

Engels’ philosophy of science is dealt with very briefly, namely the postulated three laws of dialectics. This, however, is hardly an adequate treatment of Engels’ thinking, the range of his epistemology (which is also revealed in his critique of Dühring) and limitations of his reasoning. What is most sustainable in his thinking is the conception of nonreductive materialism, which can be otherwise formulated as (materialist) emergentism and the theory of integrative levels (Needham, et al). But the ‘dialectical’ aspect of the dialectics of nature—particularly the question of contradiction— is the most controversial, as here Engels is inconsistent and sloppy.

I mentioned Sheehan because here we find the limitations of her otherwise wide-ranging work on the subject (1985) which are echoed here, and from which I have doubts about her own comprehension of dialectics.

We get the bare bones of Lenin’s philosophical approach, especially as relates to the sciences, in which his rejection of positivism as an ideology of science rather than science itself is the most impressive and lasting aspect of Materialism and Empiriocriticism. We get nothing of his take on dialectics.

The treatment of the Frankfurt School is limited to a few general remarks about the orientation of Adorno (alluding to the Positivist Dispute) and Marcuse. They are indeed limited as is suggested but even more limited than what it mentioned. Adorno and Horkheimer are not completely consistent throughout their work (their separate works, that is, not their joint work). They exhibit a tendency to reduce science to positivism, but occasionally they recognize a distinction. One has to burrow into Adorno’s university lectures to find some more intelligent statements on the subject. On the other hand, Marcuse is consistently awful in his approach to science.

Finally, because the authors are interested really only in studies of science, they ignore huge swaths of Marxist philosophy that indeed belong to the ‘philosophy of science’ and address key epistemological and ideological issues. After Lenin, we get Hessen on the emergence of modern science, but we get nothing philosophical from the Soviet bloc, which includes incisive critiques of positivist and irrationalist doctrines, and/or are affirmative philosophical works, or Ilyenkov. Outside of the USSR, there is the well-known Althusser. There is also Della Volpe, who has an unorthodox view of dialectics and takes his inspiration from Galileo. There is also the Poznan School of scientific idealization, which is not dogmatically anti-Hegelian, but in addition to its engagement with the sciences also views Marx as in the tradition of Galileo. These are some examples of what is missing in the authors’ targeted approach.

Some references of interest:

Cassirer, E. (1981) Symbol, Myth, and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935–1945, ed, by D. P. Verene, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Creath, R. (2016) “Carnap and Ontology: Foreign Travel and Domestic Understanding,” in S. Blatti and S. Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 190–99.

Damerow, Peter. Abstraction and Representation: Essays on the Cultural Evolution of Thinking, introduction by Wolfgang Edelstein and Wolfgang Lefèvre, translated from the German by Renate Hanauer. Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 1996. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science; v. 175)

Frank, P. (1957) Philosophy of Science: The Link Between Science and Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice‑Hall.

Frank, P. (2021) The Humanistic Background of Science, ed. by G. A. Reisch and A. T. Tuboly, Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Friedman, M. (2001) The Dynamics of Reason, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.

Gaukroger, S. (2006) The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210–1685, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaukroger, S. (2010) The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1680–1760, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaukroger, S. (2016) The Natural and the Human: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1739–1841, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaukroger, S. (2020) Civilization and the Culture of Science: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1795–1935, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Humphreys. New Yor: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Renn, Jürgen. The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.

Pateman, J. (2019) “Lenin without dogmatism,” Studies in East European Thought 71 (2): 99–117.

Sheehan, H. (1985) Marxism and the Philosophy of Science: A Critical History: The First Hundred Years, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

Sheehan, H. (2022) “Marxism, Science, and Science Studies,” Monthly Review 74 (1): 35–48.

Uebel, T., and Limbeck‑Lilienau, C. (eds.) (2022) The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism, London and New York: Routledge.

Verhaegh, S. (2025a) “The Analytic Turn in American Philosophy: An Institutional Perspective — Part I: Scientific Versus Humanistic Philosophy,” HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 15 (1): 61–98.

Verhaegh, S. (2025b) “The Analytic Turn in American Philosophy: An Institutional Perspective — Part II: Analytic vs Continental Philosophy,” HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 15 (2): forthcoming.

Zilsel, E. (2003) The Social Origins of Modern Science, foreword by Joseph Needham, introduction by Diederick Raven & Wolfgang Krohn, edited by Diederick Raven, Wolfgang Krohn, and Robert S. Cohen. Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 2003. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science; v. 200)

The Routledge Handbook of the History of Philosophy of Science After Kant
(Contents)

Modern Science and Its Philosophy
by Philipp Frank

Introduction by Robert S. Cohen, to
Boris Hessen, The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s ‘Principia’

Dialectic by Harold I. Brown

Harold I. Brown on presuppostions & scientific theory change

Galvano Della Volpe
by Mark W. Epstein
+ bibliography

Modern Science and Its Philosophy
by Philipp Frank

Introduction by Robert S. Cohen, to
Boris Hessen, The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s ‘Principia’

Intellectual and Manual Labor: Contents
by Alfred Sohn-Rethel

Note on the Poznan School

Vienna Circle, Karl Popper, Frankfurt School, Marxism, McCarthyism & American Philosophy:
Selected Bibliography

Greek Philosophy, the Scientific Revolution, Abstraction, Phenomenology, & the Money Economy:
Selected Bibliography