Harold I. Brown on presuppostions & scientific theory change

Much discussion of theory change has been confused by a failure to distinguish between two different theses: the thesis that if we are to have a rational basis for choosing between rival theories at a particular moment in the history of science, we must have some standard to appeal to which is accepted by proponents of both theories, and the thesis that if scientific change is to be rational there must be some eternal standard against which we can compare any theories. Proponents of the latter view have sought their eternal standard either in some set of general principles independent of any specific theory or in a set of theory-independent observations or laws; sometimes a writer appeals to both kinds of criteria at the same time. Among the suprascientific principles that have been used in traditional philosophy of science are such supposed a priori principles as the principle of causality, of sufficient reason, or of the uniformity and simplicity of nature. More recently, we find a number of philosophers trying to construct an inductive logic as well as Popper’s attempt to dictate a set of methodological rules to which science must conform. The main thrust of these suggested criteria is that they have nothing to do with any particular theory, and therefore can serve as criteria by which theories can be evaluated. Similarly, empiricists have maintained that the ability to account for the widest range of possible observations can serve as a standard because these observations are taken to be free of the influence of any theory. It is in this vein that Feigl, responding to claims that scientific observations are theory-laden because of the instruments used in making them, suggests that “it is the domain of the elementary, rather directly testable empirical laws (instead of the ‘given,’ be it conceived as sense data or as perceptual Gestalten) that is the testing ground to which we should refer in the rational reconstruction of the confirming or disconfirming evidence for scientific theories.” [36]

Yet, as we have seen, the appeal to observations and to empirical laws cannot be made independently of theory, even principles such as universal causation are integral parts of scientific theories which can be questioned as a result of later scientific developments, and while methodological rules such as an inductive logic are indeed independent of any scientific theory, they are integral parts of particular philosophical interpretations of science and thus no more capable of providing eternal standards than a specific scientific postulate. The choice between scientific theories does not take place by appeal to eternal standards, established by philosophers, but rather by appeal to scientific standards which are provided by the theories involved. In order to develop this point we must return, again, to the examination of specific cases of scientific change in their historical circumstances.

SOURCE: Brown, Harold I. Perception, Theory, and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1977; The University of Chicago Press, 1979), Chapter 9: Discovery, Section “Scientific Change”, p. 140.

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Harold I. Brown @ academia.edu