Wittgenstein and Dialectic: An Annotated Bibliography

Note: Annotations marked “abstract” are taken from other sources. Those marked “comment” are my own.

Bakhurst, D. J. “Action, Epistemology and 'The Riddle of the Self',” Studies in Soviet Thought. O 82; 24: 185-209.

ABSTRACT: F T. Mikhailov's criticism of foundationalism and attempt to center epistemology on "action" rather than contemplation are discussed. His views on linguistic creativity and universality are treated in the light of Wittgenstein's rule-following arguments and his analysis of practical creativity, the dialectical interaction of subject and object, is approached by invoking a cognitive theory of reasons for action, thereby demonstrating the relevance of theories currently popular in the west to the study of contemporary Soviet philosophy.

Cook, Daniel. “Hegel, Marx and Wittgenstein,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, Fall 1984; 10: 49-74.

ABSTRACT: Several writers have recently claimed that there are definite affinities between Wittgenstein's (later) thought and that of Hegel and Marx, especially in their respective conceptions of dialectic, language and "praxis". I show that these purported areas of agreement between the Hegelian tradition and Wittgenstein are neither substantive nor illuminating.

Dambska, Izydora. “Lukasiewicz and Wittgenstein on the Principle of Contradiction,” Dialectics and Humanism, 1990; 17(1): 25-29.

Goldstein, Laurence. “Smooth and Rough Logic,” Philosophical Investigations, April1992; 15(2): 93-110.

ABSTRACT: A logic that reflects correct practices of reasoning may be called (following Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 107) a "rough" logic, and contrasts with, for example, the pure or "a priori" conception that is common among formal logicians. I show that, in a rough logic, contradictions cannot be asserted, thus vindicating Aristotle and refuting modern dialetheist logicians. This leads to a discussion of the meaning of the word ‘not' and to some remarks contrasting a dialetheist solution to the logico-semantical paradoxes with a solution that I favor.

Goodman, Russell. “Style, Dialectic, and the Aim of Philosophy in Wittgenstein and the Taoists,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, March 1976; 3: 145-157.

ABSTRACT: I begin by examining the styles of writing which Wittgenstein and the Taoists Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu employ, taking the position that their unusual styles are developed with the aim of 'bumping' the reader into a new awareness of the world. The desire for a new way of looking at things yields a common emphasis on philosophy as an activity. In the second part of the paper I exhibit the active nature of the philosophical enterprise via the notion of dialectic. In the third part of the paper, I examine the aim of philosophy, claiming that peace is a common goal.

Granger, Gilles-Gaston. “Propositions Pour un Positivisme,” Man and World, August 1969; 2: 386-409.

ABSTRACT: A philosophical attitude is specified, which could be considered a form of positivism. traditional (Comte, Mach) and contemporary (Wittgenstein, Carnap) positivism is criticized. Eight theses are presented, about experience, phenomena, the scientific object, dialectic, logic and philosophy. As a conclusion, a conception of the status and mutual relations of science and philosophy is proposed.

Levi, Albert William. “Wittgenstein as Dialectician,” Journal of Philosophy, Fall 1964; 61: 127-138.

ABSTRACT: The paper argues that a close reading of Wittgenstein dispells the underlying assumption that the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations are incongruous and (therefore) that the philosophy of Wittgenstein is disjunctive. The evidences of the intermediate Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics attest to continuity in Wittgenstein's philosophical development. What is revealed is an inherently dialectical mentality, momentarily stunned by the systematic vision with which Principia Mathematica had for three decades dazzled the European mind, until, rudely jarred awake by Goedel's 1931 paper, it could resume the dialectic.

Malachowski, Alan. “Dialectical Mathematicalism: Wittgenstein on Gödel,” Dialogos [Revista del Departmento de Filosofia Universidad de Puerto Rico], July 1989; 24: 7-20.

Munson, Thomas N. “An Interpretation of Hegel's Political Thought,” Monist, January 1964; 48: 97-111.

ABSTRACT: Hegel and Wittgenstein, notwithstanding the profound differences between them, were both deeply concerned with the question "what is explanation?" having argued elsewhere that this is indeed the core issue in Wittgenstein, Munson argues the same here about Hegel, in regard to the latter's political thought. After focussing on the relation of particular individual to state, the state as the embodiment of reason and the concretization of dialectic, he concludes by spelling out ways in which Hegel makes common cause with Wittgenstein, and by raising various difficulties with Hegel over against Wittgenstein.

Narskii, I. S. “The Concept of Formal Analysis and Dialectics,” Soviet Studies in Philosophy, Spring 1964; 2: 45-56.

Ritsert, Jurgen. “The Wittgenstein-Problem in Sociology or: the ‘Linguistic Turn' as a Pirouette,” In: The Social Horizon of Knowledge (Rodopi: Netherlands, 1991).

ABSTRACT: Three main types of relations between the terms "language-game", "form of life" and "society" are shown in Wittgenstein's work. Their relation to specific social ontologies in sociology is documented. The thesis is that a dialectical type of relation between "Sprachspeil" and "Lebensform" seems to be most fruitful for current sociology.

Singh, R. P. “Contradiction and Sublation: Hegel on Dialectic,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly, July 1991; 503-518.

ABSTRACT: The work is to formulate Hegel's dialectic by emphasizing on its two operative terms: contradiction and sublation. It is proposed to be achieved in the following manner: I: Hegel's critical assessment of Kant's transcendental   dialectic; both for its basic distinction between understanding and reason, and, for its general dissatisfaction with traditional metaphysics. II: To explicate the three principles of Hegel's dialectic—unity and struggle of opposites, quantitative to qualitative changes and vice-versa, and negation of negation. III: Hegel's dialectic as a counter-thrust to any form of positivism from Hume to Russell, earlier Wittgenstein and Ayer.

Torbert, William R. “On the Possibility of Revolution Within the Boundaries of Propriety,” Humanitas [Journal of the Institute of Formative Spirituality] . Fall 1976; 12: 111-146.

ABSTRACT: The article traces the relationship between originality and conformity in a dialectical fashion. Referring particularly to the work of Bergson, Kohlberg, and Wittgenstein, the article argues that social norms are neither so clear nor so controlling as people ordinarily think. an individual or a society can develop a regular process of exploring the unknown—of exploring beyond explicitly structured experience toward new sources of mutual trust and authority. A table of institutions shows the ideal function of each major social institution in maintaining conformity to existing structures and in encouraging originality.

Visvader, John. “The Use of Paradox in Uroboric Philosophies,” Philosophy East and West,  October 1978; 28: 455-467.

ABSTRACT: Uroboric philosophies are philosophies which attempt, like the serpent Uroboros, to swallow or negate themselves. Being critical of philosophy or the use of langauge these philosophies state their criticisms and then, by the use of paradoxes of various kinds, cancel their own statements. The article examines the problems and methods of the philosophies of Sextus Empiricus and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the western tradition and Buddhism and Taoism in the eastern tradition in order to better understand the dialectics of these various philosophies.

On this site

Frank, Philipp. Modern Science and Its Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949. Reprint: New York: George Braziller, 1955. Introduction - Historical Background, pp. 1-52.

Wolniewicz, Boguslaw. "Wittgensteinian Foundations of Non-Fregean Logic," in Contemporary East European Philosophy, Vol. 3, edited by Edward D'Angelo, David DeGrood, and Dale Riepe (Bridgeport, CT: Spartacus Books, 1971), pp. 231-243.

Adorno on Wittgenstein & the Dialectical Essence of Philosophy

Adorno on Wittgenstein’s Indescribable Vulgarity

Adorno on Descartes, Wittgenstein, Hegel

Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Philosophy as Negation (Dumain diary)

Logicomix: Logic and Madness Reviewed by Ralph Dumain

Wittgenstein and Hegel: An Annotated Bibliography

Wittgenstein, Marxism, Sociology: An Annotated Bibliography

Philosophy of Paraconsistency & Associated Logics (Web Guide)

On other sites

@nti-Dialectics, by Rosa Lichtenstein

Lichtenstein, Rosa. “Wittgenstein and Marxism.” 2006.

Marcos, João. "Wittgenstein & Paraconsistência," CLE e-Prints, vol. 1(7), 2001.

Monk, Ray. (1995), “Full-blooded Bolshevism: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics,” Wittgenstein Studies 1, 1995.