Leibniz & ‘soft reason’ – M. Dascal
Dascal, Marcelo. Nihil sine ratione -> Blandior ratio (‘Nothing without a reason -> A softer reason’). In H. Poser (ed.), Nihil sine ratione (Proceedings of the VII. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress). Berlin, 2001, Volume I, pages 276-280.
The main thesis of this paper is that Leibniz’s encompassing rationalism, as expressed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason (as in the formula nihil est sine ratione: Grua 13, 267, 268, etc.), requires a substantial modification of the conception of Reason usually attributed to Leibniz. This modification consists in a shift from a conception that views deductive logic as the paradigm of Reason to a conception that acknowledges also the need and legitimacy of non-conclusive forms of reasoning as essential components of rationality (as in the formula blandior ratio: C, 34). I will first survey how extensive, albeit usually overlooked, is Leibniz’s concern with these “weaker” forms of reasoning, and how crucial they are for many of his practical and theoretical endeavors.
These purposes are political and theological (the two hardly distinguishable in Leibniz’s time), as well as anti-skeptical and generally metaphysical. Pure logic won’t of course work in the social world, hence rationality must be adapted to practical intervention. Dascal maintains that a focus on ‘soft reason’ will shed new light on the nature of Leibniz’s rationalism.
Related articles by Dascal on the web:
Ex pluribus unum? Patterns in 522+ Texts of Leibniz’s Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe VI, 4. The Leibniz Review 13: 105-154, (2003).
Alter et etiam: Rejoinder to Schepers. The Leibniz Review 14: 137-151 (2004).
See also:
Leibniz (entry in old blog)
