Studies in a Dying Culture

Dascal, Marcello. How rational can a polemic across the analytic-continental ‘divide’ be?, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9(3): 313-339, 2001.

In order to specify controversy’s position within the large family of polemical dialogues, I propose to distinguish between three members of the subfamily to which controversies belong. I will call them ‘discussion’, ‘dispute’, and ‘controversy’. The main criteria for this typology are: the scope of the disagreement, the kind of content involved in it, the presumed means for solving the disagreement, and the ends pursued by the contenders.

Note commentary on Kant’s approach, with side remarks on Kuhn and Popper.

Dascal applies his model to the analytic/continental divide. Example:

Consider for example the Rorty/Habermas debate, held in Warsaw in 1996 (cf. Niznik and Sanders 1996). Is it a case of a debate across the analytic-continental “divide”? In a sense yes, because the issues debated – e.g., contextualism, relativism, historicism, objectivism, the role of language in philosophy, the nature of rationality and of philosophical inquiry – are recurrent topics in any characterization of that divide. Yet, the contenders are not clearly aligned along the lines of the divide, for each of them has concocted a special blend of “analytic” cum “continental” components in developing their philosophical positions. In fact, it is Rorty, the “ex-analytic” philosopher, that represents in this debate positions that are today considered typically “continental”, although he does so in the name of the “American” philosophical tradition; whereas Habermas has g[rafted] many “analytic” elements onto the essentially Kantian basis of his philosophy.

Even if one takes a clearcut case of an across-divide debate, perhaps the clearest available case, upon inspection it reveals also the mixed nature of the “traditions” in confrontation. I am referring to the well-known debate between opponents (Searle and Derrida) who are usually taken to belong to each of the camps across the “divide”. Yet, one might ask, how representative of “continental” philosophy is, say, Derrida’s deconstructive method or his whole way of philosophizing?; or, for that matter, to what extent Searle’s commitment to the foundational role of intentionality in the philosophy of mind, of language, and of action, as well as in social philosophy, is not quite similar – at least metaphysically – to that of Husserl and other phenomenologists? In fact, questions such as these underly the debate, and are sometimes evoked and thematized in it.

Dascal that suggests that Searle is insufficiently attentive to the delineation of traditions he evokes.

Pace Searle’s opening claim that Derrida’s discussion of Austin should not be regarded as “a confrontation between two prominent philosophical traditions” (1977: 198), it seems to me that the Searle – Derrida debate that follows that discussion is a prime example of the kind of confrontation that both stems from and contributes to entrenching the “divide” we are endeavoring to analyze in the present conference. Not only because Searle and Derrida are, respectively, prominent representatives of the “analytic” and “continental” camps. They have also developed these traditions along lines that reinforce, rather than reduce their opposition. Searle has raised the analytic requirement of a precise language to the status of a “principle of expressibility” (whatever can be thought can be expressed clearly and precisely); he has also privileged the role of “constitutive rules” in his account of how language functions; he employs and demands strictly logical arguments for supporting or refuting any philosophical thesis; and the aim he consistently pursues is the construction of philosophical theories. Derrida, on the other hand, fears the emasculation of thought that may result from the insistence on clarity and precision; he privileges metaphorical language, revels at playing with words, produces texts where associative and analogical links rather than deductive ones prevail, and is mostly concerned with deconstructing philosophical theories. Under these conditions, their confrontation is prima facie poised to be a dispute – and a rather virulent one. What is remarquable is that one can discern in it – as we shall see – characteristic features of an interesting philosophical controversy.

The immediate bone of contention is Austin. Fighting over how to frame the discussion. Searle argues for Derrida’s ineptitude and insists upon the centrality of intentionality. He accuses Derrida of not following proper rules for analyzing Austin. Searle seems to think he is engaging in a discussion, while Derrida is working a controversy. Searle won’t have any of this. This Dascal calls the “insulation strategy”. Derrida, in response to Searle’s acrimonious attack, questions Searle’s very own signature of his statement, as a lesson in applied deconstruction.

Searle does not take up the debate again directly, but later, in reviewing a book by Jonathan Culler, attacks deconstruction as an obscurantist scam. Derrida replies in kind.

At this point, the interchange has reached the level of dispute, though Dascal still sees controversy at work. Maybe the argument has yielded some progress after all.

The moral of the story? “We might now ask what kinds of polemical exchanges are most typical of the analytical-continental rift, and what would it take to “bridge” such a rift.” (Another example: Carnap vs Heidegger.)

Consider now an eventual exchange ruled by what Bar Hillel (1962) has candidly called “A pre-requisite for rational philosophical discussion”. Bar-Hillel grants the right of philosophers on both sides of the divide to use the object-language they choose. But he contends that there is an asymmetry between the analytic and the continental camp: “One cannot expect that the analytic philosopher, while endeavoring to persuade his speculative colleague of the cognitive poverty of his ways of philosophizing, should himself use speculative discourse for this purpose. This type of discourse is unintelligible to him in any capacity, including that of metadiscourse” (Bar Hillel 1962: 357). Protected by this “veil of unintelligibility”, the analytic philosopher can stipulate his pre-requisite: “I am ready to listen and argue with him [the speculative metaphysician] only if the (meta-)language, in which he explains to me his reasons for challenging my standards, itself complies with these standards” (ibid.) The speculative metaphysician, on the other hand, is not entitled to a similar move because he doesn’t claim neither the unintelligibility of the opponents’ views, nor his own incapacity to use “scientific (observational plus theoretical) metalanguage”. Bar-Hillel thus proposes to adopt his own language as the lingua meta-franca of philosophical discussion. On the grounds, of course, that it is clear, universally intelligible, and hence appropriate for the exercise of rationality.

Bar-Hillel’s “generous” proposal is not going to work for the continental philosopher. (I don’t think Dascal quite says it, but this metaphilosophical approach is analogous to Kant’s.)

Dascal, while attentive to the problem of tradition boundary policing, does not question the categories of ‘analytical’ and ‘continental’. As usual, Marx is excluded from such a “debate”, most symptomatic of its limitations. And, while undoubtedly many many others are excluded via this construction of the philosophical field, what the contending parties tacitly agree on may be just as important as their irreconcilable differences. They have a far greater stake in excluding something more than one another.

Judging from this interchange, I see no value in Derrida whatever. Carnap vs. Heidegger represents a limited positivist programme vs an irrationalist Counter-Enlightenment Nazi. Naturally, I would choose the former over the latter, but the two-party system ill serves philosophy just as it does politics.

Dascal has written extensively applying his schema of argumentation to several situations. I will report on other articles on this topic.

See also Marcelo Dascal: Publications

John Searle‘s web site

and my bibliographies & study guides:

Philosophical Style
Philosophy of History of Philosophy & Historiography of Philosophy
Biographical and Psychological Dimensions of Philosophy: Selected Bibliography
Positivism vs Life Philosophy (Lebensphilosophie)